Introduction

Rethinking European Spaces: Territory, Borders, Governance

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Thinking about European Spaces

Nowadays Europe is unfamiliar territory: pan-European spaces coexist with national territories, borderlands soften the sharp outer edges of the EU, and networks are indifferent to borders as they connect Europeans to each other and to the wider world. Borders have undergone dramatic changes, not only in terms of their extent and range: enlargement has massively lengthened the EU’s borders and projected them beyond the former Iron Curtain. On some accounts, Europe has been rebordered; the external borders of the EU protect a borderless single market within which internal space mobility is greatly enhanced. On other accounts, borders are themselves networked, mobile and diffused throughout society. These changes have also impacted upon structures of pan-European governance, which combine the management of genuinely European spaces and Commission-sponsored Euro-regions with more traditional levels of national governance. These shifts point to important transformations in the relationship between European spaces, borders, and governance. The EU can no longer simply be viewed as a Europe of nation-states or a putative supra-state. It is also a multi-levelled or networked polity, a borderless internal market, or a ‘Europe of the regions’. The spaces of European governance — and particularly the relationship between spaces, borders, and governance — have never been so complex, nor in need of thorough academic reappraisal.

The spatial novelty of Europe, and attempts to apprehend and understand this novelty, can be seen very clearly in the terms and concepts with which contemporary Europe is described and analysed. In the past few years, a whole new lexicon of spatial politics has been incorporated into EU studies: polycentricity (multiple centres and diffused growth rather than core-periphery distinctions); ‘network Europe’ (an EU characterized by connectivity and mobility); territorial cohesion (the balanced distribution of economic activities across the Union); multi-level governance (partnerships between EU
institutions, national governments and regional and local authorities); borderlands (zones of interaction between countries rather than ‘hard’ frontiers). The brief mention of these terms and concepts makes it clear that the relationship between spaces, borders and governance is an increasingly important dimension of the study of contemporary Europe. This goes hand in hand with a reordering of Europe’s spatial hierarchies leading to the competitive role of regions and cities being enhanced vis-à-vis that of the national state, and a ‘rescaling of space’ (Brenner, 2004) wherein cities and regions become networked within pan-European space and transborder networks assume a greater importance. In addition, European borders (captured by the idea of ‘borderlands’) are deemed to have their own spatiality and, as such, require their own regimes of governance. The new spaces of European governance are intimately related to the processes of bordering and rebordering, often associated with securitization, that have proceeded alongside the processes leading to a removal of the internal borders which for so long prevented the emergence of a genuine European space.

The ‘Spatial Turn’ in EU Studies

The ‘governance turn’ in EU studies is well documented (for example, Marks et al., 1996; Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch, 2004; Bache and Flinders, 2005) but has largely ignored the transformation of space that this entails; the governance turn also includes a ‘spatial turn’ (Berezin, 2003). Space is much more important to EU governance than suggested by either the idea of multi-level governance or networked polity. Rather than being primarily concerned with state-building or the institutionalization of governance structures, the EU is centrally concerned with the construction of European spaces. Put simply, the EU actively constructs European spaces, which it alone is capable of governing. Stated in different terms, the EU works to create new policy networks and governance spaces within which it can deploy European solutions to European problems (Delanty and Rumford, 2005).

The recent EU studies agenda, highlighting such processes as Europeanization, rebordering and securitization, network Europe, and polity-building has contributed to a ‘spatial turn’, a concern not just with novel spaces and ways of understanding them, but the very processes by which governance spaces are constructed and the way space is constitutive of social and political relations. Interestingly, this concern with European spaces has not emerged from within the conventional EU studies literature generated by the academic disciplines of Political Science and International Relations. Exploration of the spatiality of European governance has a multidisciplinary provenance, which in turn reveals some interesting general shifts in the way the EU is being studied. One is the recognition that in order to understand the dynamics of contemporary
European transformation, EU studies must encourage a greater diversity of (theoretical) perspectives (Bourne and Cini, 2006). Another is the recognition that developments in Europe are best studied within a global framework, thereby ameliorating the more solipsistic readings of the EU as the sole author of European developments.

A third is the increasing emphasis placed on the social dimensions of integration; the troubling absence of civil society, the democratic deficit, the stillborn Constitution, the nature of the social model, and the question of European identity(s). In short, there are now more ways of studying Europe, both its internal dynamics and its place in the world, and there is an increasing interest in and receptivity to a broad range of influences not hitherto seen as directly connected with the study of the EU. Of note in this respect are the work of the following: Ulrich Beck and co-workers on cosmopolitanization and reflexive modernization in Europe (Beck et al., 2003; Beck and Grande, 2004; Beck, 2006); Anglo-Foucauldian accounts of governmentality (Barry, 2001; Larner and Walters, 2004; Walters and Haahr, 2005; see also Walters, Richardson, and Kramsch in this volume); Manuel Castells’ ‘network state’ thesis in which a space of places (the territorial nation-state) is being replaced by a space of flows, and territorial borders are easily transcended by flows and mobilities which take place within globalized circuits of information and exchange (the European Union is seen as the paradigm of the network state) (Castells, 2000); and a range of approaches which draw heavily upon accounts of social and political transformation derived from contemporary social theory (Balibar, 2004; Bauman, 2004; Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Outhwaite and Ray, 2005; Eder, 2006; see also Axford, Delanty, and Lawn in this volume).

Similarly, key recent publications which have addressed the spatial dimensions of governance and the centrality of borders to understanding European space have not always emerged from within conventional EU studies. Indeed, the emerging agenda has been largely shaped by the contributions of scholars from the fields of geography, sociology, urban studies, anthropology, and spatial planning (and this is reflected in the contributions to this volume). Recently published studies of the relationship between Europe’s spaces, borders and governance include the following. Berezin and Schain’s edited volume Europe Without Borders: Remapping Territory, Citizenship and Identity in a Transnational Age (Berezin and Schain, 2003) is paradigmatic of the ‘spatial turn’ and addresses many central themes: the supercession of territoriality, the changing role of borders, the transnational foundations of Europe, cosmopolitanism. In addition, it focuses on the societal dimensions of integration (as reflected in the sub-title), the public sphere, national/European identity, and transnational networks. It is also notable for the fact that the majority of contributors are geographers and sociologists, rather than political scientists. While the book might be criticized
for taking a rather conservative approach to the question of European space, interpreting the spatial recalibration of Europe as a reorganization of existing spaces, it certainly occupies central place in the emerging literature and has the ability to become an agenda-setting text. More radical is Neil Brenner’s *New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood* (Brenner, 2004) which provides an account of the ‘post-national’ spaces of European governance, particularly the way states mobilize urban space to develop a competitive advantage in the global capitalist economy, thereby accounting for the relation between supranationalism and the resurgence of urban and regional economies in a globalizing Europe. From a different perspective Jensen and Richardson’s *Making European Space* (Jensen and Richardson, 2004) critically examines EU attempts to construct a single European space, or what they term a ‘monotopia.’ The Single Market and single currency are examples of a concerted attempt to create Europe as ‘one space’ made possible by networks of mobility (see also Richardson, this volume). In the terms outlined by Castells the EU has, through enhanced mobility and connectivity, attempted to construct a Europe of global competitive flows to replace of a Europe of territorial places (Rumford, 2004).

These interventions have been complemented by a range of other texts which are all centrality concerned with the relationship between spaces, borders, and governance and what form of transformation this represents. Donald McNeill’s *New Europe: Imagined Spaces* (McNeill, 2004), Novoa and Lawn’s *Fabricating Europe: The Formation of an Educational Space* (Novoa and Lawn, 2002), Delanty and Rumford’s *Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization* (Delanty and Rumford, 2005), and Walters and Haahr’s *Governing Europe: Discourse, Governmentality and European Integration* (Walters and Haahr, 2005) all examine the ways in which the EU has constructed European spaces as a technique of governance.

**Spaces and Borders**

European space is not only increasingly networked internally but distinctions between inside and outside, Europe and non-Europe have also become blurred. Europe’s internal borders have not only become more numerous (but for many Europeans also easier to negotiate), but more importantly perhaps borders can be seen to possess their own spatiality. We have noted how external borders have become transformed. Successive enlargements of the EU, and especially the most recent round in 2004, have led not simply to the creation of new and longer Eastern borders but to a new border regime in the form of the European Neighbourhood Policy within which borders come to be seen as spaces to be governed rather than simply divisions between EU and non-EU (Emerson, 2003).
While the idea of ‘network Europe’ has struck a chord with commentators attempting to come to terms with the rapid and fundamental transformation of Europe in the post-Cold War period there exist other, conflicting accounts of the reconfiguration of Europe which emphasize the development of ‘hard’ external borders as a corollary of the increased internal mobility associated with the EU’s single market and single currency (Zielonka, 2002). In short, there exists a tension between the idea of ‘network Europe’ and the Schengenland model of securitized external borders. Schengenland represents a region of unrestricted internal mobility coupled with ‘hard’ external borders designed to control flows of terrorists, criminals, and illegal immigrants (Andreas, 2003). It is common to encounter the idea that borders are becoming less significant between EU member states at the same time as the EU’s external border is heavily policed, leading to a defensive shell designed to prevent seepage of the economic gains made by the EU in the face of economic globalization, and the unwanted influx of migrants from the near abroad.

The unresolved tension between ideas of ‘networked Europe’ and Schengenland has opened up the possibility of a more nuanced account of Europe’s borders, in particular an awareness that the EU’s borders are becoming differentiated and can vary in scope and tightness (Hassner, 2002; see also Diez, this volume). For example, the EU’s security borders are far more rigid than the equivalent economic, telecommunication, and educational borders. One problem with the ‘rebordering’ thesis advanced by Andreas and others, which emphasizes the need to reinforce and securitize borders, is that it relies on a rather undifferentiated notion of borders, which are intelligible only in terms of policing and security and a defence against external threats (the mobility of illegal immigrants, terrorists, and traffickers in people and drugs). In fact, Schengen borders and EU borders more generally are not singular and unitary, and are designed to encourage various kinds of mobility, particularly for certain categories of immigrants, migrant workers, and students (Rumford, 2006b).

The rebordering thesis cannot easily accommodate the differentially permeable borders of ‘network Europe.’ At the same time, the idea of a Europe defined by flows and networks downplays the importance of territorial bordering and the ways in which political priorities can result in some borders being more important than others: what was previously the EU border with Eastern Europe (along the line of the Iron Curtain) has become relatively unimportant when compared to the enlarged border with Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and the rest of the countries comprising the EU’s ‘ring of friends’. The idea of ‘network Europe’ — and the idea of the monotopic internal space of the single market — has changed the way we think about territorial spaces, but ironically has tended to work with conventional notions of borders. It is

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argued that network Europe can only be properly understood in conjunction with a notion of networked borders.

The idea of networked borders draws attention to the ways in which Europe’s borders are increasingly mobile and diffused throughout society. Such borders are not fixed in the way territorial borders are, rather they can be modulated within and between existing administrative entities. European borders are periodically dissolved, constructed afresh, shifted, reconstituted. Examples include: common European borders replacing a collection of national borders; previously important borders — such as the Europe-defining ones between East and West Germany, and disputed ones between Germany and Poland — ceasing to be contested or troubled demarcations; the eastward movement of the ‘important’ borders of Europe — to the border between Slovakia and the Ukraine, or the Baltic States and Russia, for example; the ‘Mediterranean’ enlargement of the EU in the 1980s creating a new north-south frontier within Spain (Suarez-Navaz, 2004). However, this is not the only sense in which Europe can be said to possess ‘networked borders’. Europe’s borders are increasingly networked in the sense that they attempt to manage mobility and as such are constructed in locations where mobility is most intense: at airline check-in desks and Eurostar terminals, along Europe’s motorways routes and trans-European road networks (Walters, 2006). Borders are not only to be found at the perimeter of national or EU territory (McNeill, 2004).

Europe’s Novel Spatiality

It will be instructive to examine three attempts to apprehend the novelty of European space: the EU as a monotopia; borderlands; and polycentric development.

As Jensen and Richardson (2004) point out, the EU conceives of itself as a ‘monotopia’, a single, common space within which all constraints to the movement of goods, peoples, services, and money have been removed. The EU as a realm of freedom and mobility means that Europe is increasingly interconnected and its various component parts (member states, sub-national regions) are seamlessly woven together. The EU’s monotopic vision is central to the governance of European space: ‘this idea of monotopic Europe lies at the heart of new ways of looking at European territory … a rationality of monotopia exists, and it is inextricably linked with a governmentality of Europe, expressed in a will to order space, to create a seamless and integrated space … which is being pursued through the emerging field of European spatial policy’ (Jensen and Richardson, 2004, 3).

There are good reasons to challenge the EU’s rather optimistic view of intra-European mobility leading to monotopia (Jensen and Richardson, 2004;
Delanty and Rumford, 2005). Firstly, it does not recognize the fact that European space is dynamic and changing; the EU added 10 more members in 2004 and this massive addition of European space and its degree of connectivity and seamless integration is variable at best. Future enlargements will further test the monotopic ‘smoothness’ of the EU. Secondly, the image of Europe as a monotopia conveniently ignore the fact that European space is not contiguous: Greece has (as yet) no land borders with any other member states, non-EU countries are embedded within ‘European space’ (Switzerland, Norway), and both France and Spain include territory which is not in Europe (in Africa and South America).

The idea of the EU as a monotopia also leads to some rather simplistic ideas about Europe’s borders, particularly the assumption that they can be easily superseded by mobility and connectivity. However, it does encourage us to confront the mutability of borders, their increasingly differentiated and partial nature, and the degree to which they can work to connect as well as divide (Rumford, 2006a). On the latter point, and aligned with the idea that EU borders are constantly shifting, what were previously borders between the EU 15 and the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe are now, following accession, part of EU space. In the same way, current EU borders with Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, and Croatia can be thought of as potential EU space, a space which is already in the process of formation as a result of extensive economic, educational, and communication networks (such as Trans-European road and rail networks and educational mobilities) which traverse those countries, and existing regional and trans-border programmes which are designed to ameliorate problems associated with marginality: today’s external borders represent tomorrow’s internal space.

The idea that the EU has ‘borderlands’ at its furthest reaches (especially in the East) has become popular in recent times, in no small part the result of EU attempts to construct a ‘new neighbourhood’ policy and develop a ‘ring of friends’ with those countries to the east and south who are unlikely to ever become candidates for formal accession talks1 (Lavenex, 2004; Scott, 2005; Rumford, 2006b; see also Axford in this volume). The EU has become aware that the imposition of ‘hard’ borders at the outer perimeter of the EU is likely to create problems for both those EU countries on the periphery (increased insecurity beyond the border) as well as neighbours who find themselves on the other side (economic disadvantage, curtailment of historical patterns of local trade, movement of people etc.). The EU seeks to ameliorate these problems by ‘softening’ the more abrasive edges of its external borders by, for example, increasing networking opportunities with non-members and allowing for localized and routine cross-border traffic (circuits of local trade etc.). The development of this new neighbourhood policy is seen as a very positive foreign policy tool by the EU and offering access to EU markets and other networking
opportunities is viewed as a means of encouraging democratization and the restructuring of economies according to the EU’s market principles. Former Commission President Romano Prodi claimed that the policy would allow the EU and its neighbours to ‘share everything but institutions’, which can be interpreted both as a statement of the EU’s desire to pursue integration without enlargement and the desire to extend EU governance to non-EU space. In relation to theorizing the governance of space and borders the idea of borderlands is an important one because it signals the spatiality of borders themselves; no longer simply lines on a map or a physical frontier between nation-states, borders have their own space and have become zones of exchange, connectivity, and security (Barry, 2006). Borderlands should not be thought of as simply a development at Europe’s borders. Extending the point that borders have become dispersed throughout society Balibar argues that Europe itself can be thought of as a borderland, a zone of transition and mobility without territorial fixity (Balibar, 2004).

The notion of polycentricity has become a useful way of thinking about the decentred, deterritorialized, and dynamic nature of Europe. The term polycentricity has a much wider applicability to political and societal transformations under conditions of globalization (Scholte, 2004; Delanty and Rumford, 2006). Polycentricity refers to forms of non-territorial politics which emanate from a multiplicity of sites and which cannot be reduced to a single centre. On this reading, the EU is not a superstate or supra-state, or even a form of multi-level governance, but a more decentred (or multi-centred) spatial arrangement. For example, the EU is deemed to have a polycentric capital city structure (see Hein, this volume) with different functions being carried out in different ‘centres’: Brussels, Strasbourg, Luxembourg, Warsaw, and so on. The idea of polycentricity has also been important in moving away from the idea that the EU has been unsuccessful in preventing the exacerbation of a core-periphery pattern of disadvantage and unbalanced growth (Rumford, 2002). The EU now encourages polycentric development, with a large number of centres of growth within Europe, and indeed with individual member states, in tandem with aiming for greater territorial cohesion. In this sense, the idea of polycentricity has a clear connection with the idea the self-image of the EU as a monotopia, discussed earlier. In relation to theorizing borders the spatial notion of polycentricity points us in the direction of the shifting borders of economic governance, borders that are being rescaled away from the traditional ‘levels’ found within the national state and towards the European city, the assumed centre of growth and site of the accommodation of the global. Urban growth, cast in terms of the desirability of polycentric development is the main consequence of the rescaling of the state (Brenner, 2004). Brenner advances the argument that spatial Keynesianism (dominant until the mid-80s) has given way to more entrepreneurial forms of governance,
focused on urban growth centres and aimed at building the global competitive advantage of European city regions. The post-Keynesian competition state has responded to the challenges of globalization and Europeanization by working to enhance the ‘supranational territorial competitiveness of major cities and city-regions’ (Brenner, 2004, 259). The idea of polycentric development can be thought of as an attempt to reconcile the contradictory goals of increasing competitiveness at the same time as securing greater social and economic cohesion (Rumford, 2000; Atkinson, 2001; Brenner, 2003).

Whose Spaces are they Anyway?

A key dimension of the relation between spaces, borders and governance not addressed to any significant degree in the existing EU studies literature is our differential perceptions of European spaces and borders. In other words, spaces and borders are not necessarily experienced in the same way by all Europeans. What forms a common space of freedom, justice and security for some can constitute a threat to others (for example those fearing engulfment, or erosion of tradition). Similarly, what operates as an impermeable barrier to some may constitute colourful local detail to others (after all, many borders past and present are also major tourist destinations: Checkpoint Charlie; Hadrian’s Wall, the Berlin Wall). Borders can act as barriers to movement; they can also constitute gateways (airports, frontier posts, ports).

As might be expected from designations such as multi-level governance and network polity, at any given time it is possible for Europeans to occupy a multiplicity of spaces, some bordered more rigidly than others. It is not simply that crossing borders and occupying multiple spaces is easier for many (although not all) than it has ever been. Equally important is that the regular crossing of borders and transit through the many spaces they delineate has become part of our routine experience. Europe is characterized by a proliferation of borders (both in the territorial sense of borders between an increasing number of EU member states in addition to an array of new and shifting European borders, but also in the sense of diffuse institutional, legal, economic, social borders). At the same time, the importance of individual borders is in many cases very much reduced. As Etienne Balibar says, ‘borders are being both multiplied and reduced in their localization and their function, they are being thinned out and doubled…the quantitative relation between ‘border’ and ‘territory’ is being inverted’ (Balibar, 1998, 220). On this argument, we are not living in a ‘borderless Europe’: we are living in a Europe made up of borders and borderlands. Borders abound but they are frequently encountered as non-boundaries, and so for many people they are much easier to cross. Alongside this diminution in the importance of borders as physical barriers (or mental boundaries) is the awareness that ‘hard’
borders still exist at the edges of or within the territory of nation-states, brimming with security controls and state-of-the-art surveillance technology (smart borders), although they are largely unable to prevent (and we have lost confidence in their ability to control) the movement of illegal immigrants, terrorists, traffickers in people and drugs: those beyond borders are not necessarily in awe of them. In fact, according to Moises Naim, in the case of drug smugglers, ‘borders are a boon for traffickers and a nightmare for law-enforcement agencies’ (Naim, 2005, 62–3), because governments often fail to cooperate effectively between jurisdictions. While policing remains national, ‘traffickers are most effective when operating across borders — which makes them in many ways better suited to today’s world’ (Naim, 2005, 63).

For the individual, European or national borders may not be the most significant (or difficult to cross). Local or regional borders can also be substantial barriers to mobility. Some examples from London are illustrative. With the completion of the Channel Tunnel ‘the continent is no longer cut off from Britain’, and it is now possible to travel from London to Paris by train in 3 hours. The Channel Tunnel and the Eurostar rail link have not only enhanced London’s links with the rest of Europe but have contributed to the Europeanization of the South-East of Britain (see McNeill, this volume). This is an example of how transcending national borders can work to create new European spaces. But as some borders diminish in importance others are erected. In London itself the congestion charging zone creates a new map of the capital, new boundaries, a new division between inner and outer London, and consequently a new spatial experience of the capital. Congestion charging not only reformulates our ‘mental map’ of the capital it also works to transform the way people move around London, creating new reasons to travel (or not travel), and new incentives to visit certain places (and avoid others). Congestion charging has transformed the spatiality of London through a new process of bordering. For many Londoners the boundaries of the congestion charge zone may represent a more significant border and restriction on mobility than, say, the English Channel.

In fact, London has been zoned in many different ways in recent years, adding to the transformed spatiality of the capital. The security cordon around the City of London, known as the ‘ring of steel’, introduced by the Metropolitan Police in 1983 in response to the threat of bombing campaigns by the IRA was extended again in 1997, and on a further two occasions since the events of 9/11 (Coaffee, 2004). In 1996 the same approach was adopted in the Docklands business district within which a ‘collar of steel’ was constructed. In 2005, the Serious Organized Crime and Police Act became law and allowed the police to enforce an ‘exclusion zone’ preventing unauthorized protests within a half-mile radius of the Houses of Parliament. Not only do these new
securitized spaces reborder London in a major way and create new patterns of mobility and immobility, thereby creating a new spatial experience, but they also connect London to the world in new ways. Terrorist attacks on London confirm London as a global city at the same time as reinforcing its symbolic position as the capital of the UK.

This leads us to consider the non-exclusive nature of European spaces: they can be simultaneously local, national, European and global. The importance of global spaces in contemporary Europe is under-theorized in the EU studies literature (see Delanty, this volume). As Le Gales reminds us, globalization is associated with a world of flows, especially in respect of finance, communications, persons, diseases, pollution, social movements, terrorism. ‘Cities are, of course, the places that function as initial entry points for these flows’ (Le Gales, 2002, 89). In this context, cities like London, which are simultaneously regional, national, European and global, can pose a potential threat to an orderly European integration (see McNeill, this volume). In a different context, global education spaces can be said to be more important to Europeans than the European education spaces, which have been the focus of recent Commission interest (see Lawn, this volume). Arguably, the same can be said of civil society, a ‘space’, which has proved difficult to construct at a European level. Despite the Commission’s efforts there is still thought to be much more global than European civil society (Delanty and Rumford, 2005).

Political spaces and the borders which contain them used to be regulated to a high degree by the institutions of the national state, the indivisibility of national territory and maintenance of visible borders being two of the most significant markers of sovereignty. The European Union is a major actor in the construction and governance of spaces and borders. One consequence is that member states (and non-members) are much less able to decide what counts as important borders and spaces in Europe. As the external borders of the European Union shift as the result of enlargement the rebordering of Europe undergoes constant modification. Common European borders have replaced a collection of national borders, and the EU now possesses a European agency for external borders (Frontex) based in Warsaw (see Hein, this volume). We have witnessed the Eastward movement of the ‘important’ borders of Europe to the East of the former Iron Curtain which now constitute borderlands and spaces of EU governance. Krastev writes of a tug-of-war between Russia and the EU to position the ‘Schengen Wall’ either within the Ukraine, or between the Ukraine and the rest of Europe (Krastev, 2004). What is at stake is the constitution of yet another space of EU governance. In a different context, the European Union has managed to re-border Cyprus in a way which creates an entirely new spatial division between the Greek and Turkish communities (see Kramsch, this volume).
Concluding Comments

The relationship between governance, spaces, and borders is becoming a key theme in contemporary European studies. This shift in focus is the product of greater multi-disciplinarity and the result of EU scholars coming into contact with a range of literature from a broader field of European studies which was hitherto seen as peripheral: planning, anthropology, geography, education, sociology, cultural studies. The most significant developments to emerge from this multidisciplinary exchange are twofold. First, the recognition that distinctly European spaces are emerging, but that the properties, dynamics and potential of these spaces are not sufficiently understood. The corollary of this is that these European spaces cannot be reduced to the interconnectivity of previously existing places or agglomerations of member-state space. Second, the idea that the EU represents a complex configuration of spaces and borders which have created the need for unique forms of spatial governance. EU governance works by constructing European spaces which the EU alone is capable of managing. In other words, EU governance is concerned with the construction and management of European spaces, borders, and networks, as distinct from the territorial places and spaces characteristic of the nation-state.

European spaces — that is to say, spaces that are genuinely European rather than aggregations of nation-states — are synonymous with EU integration. The most familiar European spaces, for example the Single Market, Euroland, a European education space, are all spaces organized by the EU. But there is another dimension to European spaces not captured by the EU’s narrative of integration. Put simply, European spaces do not map neatly onto the space of the EU. There is not always a good fit between the European spaces constructed by processes of integration and the EU to which they belong. For example, Europeanized spaces such as the Single Market, Euroland or Schengenland, in addition to promoting the idea of deeper EU integration also make us aware of the incomplete nature of this processes (the Single Market extends beyond the borders of the EU; not all EU members share the single currency; not all EU members comprise Schengenland). Similarly, the idea of network Europe suggests both dynamic processes of pan-European connectivity, and, at the same time allows for the possibility of breaking down barriers between Europe and the rest of the world, and blurring the distinction between Europe and beyond, between EU and non-EU space.

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Notes

1 The European Neighbourhood Policy covers Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Palestinian Authority.
2 Congestion Charging applies to cars entering the central zone between 7.00 a.m. and 6.30 p.m., Monday to Friday. The cost is £8 per day. See https://www.cclondon.com/
3 Coaffee (2004, 209) notes that as a result of such securitization the average Londoner is captured on CCTV 300 times a day.

References


