EUROPE: HOW FAR?

W. H. PARKER

Controversy and confusion over the eastern boundary of Europe are as old as the name itself. Such confusion was inevitable after the western extremities of the Eurasian land mass had come, mainly through geographical ignorance, to be considered as a separate continent. This confusion could only become worse confounded when the word Europe, besides its use as a geographical name, began to express a distinctive culture or community of fluctuating extent. These two Europes, geographical and cultural, have seldom coincided.

I

If the name Europe, as some believe, is derived from the Assyrian-Phoenician erēb (sunset) and Asia from acu (sunrise), the earliest distinction between Europe and Asia may simply have been an elaboration of West and East, Occident and Orient.1 Or it may have originally represented one of two relatively small but adjacent and contrasting areas separated perhaps by the Sea of Azov, perhaps by the Hellespont.2 When first mentioned by the Greeks,3 Europe appears as the land along the north shore of the Aegean and is distinguished from Greece proper. This is the meaning given to it by Xerxes when he says: “I am about to span the Hellespont and lead an army through Europe against Greece.”4 Libya or Africa, to the south, formed the third division of the world. These divisions seemed quite arbitrary to Herodotus who was “not able to understand wherefor the earth, which is one, hath been given three several names.”5 Nor was he sure that Europe was a continent in the sense that it was surrounded by water. That was true of Asia and Africa, “but of Europe it is known by no man whether it hath the sea around it, either towards the rising sun or towards the north.”6 Thus Europe was to the Greeks primarily a geographical term, but even thus early it was occasionally endowed with emotional undertones: Europe was to Asia as Greece to Persia.7

The earliest boundary between Europe and Asia was formed by the Hellespont, the Sea of Marmora, the Bosphorus, the Black Sea, the isthmus between the Black and Caspian Seas, and the Caspian Sea; the latter was sometimes envisaged as a large gulf connected with the great ocean surrounding the earth8 (Fig. 1). Europe thus extended indefinitely eastwards to the north of Asia. This was later superseded by a boundary using the Black Sea, the Palus Maeotis or Sea of Azov (whose size and northward penetration were greatly exaggerated so as to leave only a narrow isthmus between it and the northern ocean) and the River Tanais (Don).9 The Don was made to flow southward across the isthmus; sometimes it connected the northern sea with the Palus Maeotis; sometimes it was given a source in the Montes Riphaei which paralleled the shore of the northern ocean10 (Fig. 2). From these mountains another river was occasionally made to flow northwards to the northern sea and this stream then also formed part of the boundary.11 This classical boundary lay across part of the world about which very little was known and where fantasy took the place of fact.12 The vast expanse of Russia was whittled down to an isthmus such as might suitably divide one continent from another. The short and winding Don, instead of emerging from a low marshland, had become a great river comparable to the Nile and issued forth from a notable mountain chain.
Fig. 1. The World according to Hecataeus, c. 500 B.C. (after Bunbury)

Fig. 2. The World according to Pomponius Mela, A.D. 43 (after Bunbury)
Far from seeing any increase in knowledge that might clarify the boundaries of Europe, the medieval period often simplified the problem by assuming a simple geometrical three-fold division of the world into a semi-circle and two quarter circles. As St. Augustine neatly put it, “half the world contains two parts, Europe and Africa, and the other half only, Asia.” The stagnation of medieval geography is brought home by the fact that an English chronicler, writing nearly a thousand years later, had little to add to St. Augustine: “The three partes ben not alle even lyke moche. For Asya, one of the thre, containeth halfe the erthe . . . his endes ben the mouthe of the River Nylus in the south and of the River Thanays in the north.” In medieval maps the Don, like the Nile and the Mediterranean Sea, became a major arm of water dividing the continents.

Only occasionally in the dark and early Middle Ages is the word Europe found with a cultural or emotional rather than a purely geographical meaning. Most often, even when used by ecclesiastics, Europe not only embraces both Christians of the western and eastern faiths, but also a barbarian element. However, in the fourteenth century, a growing identification of Europe with Christendom—sometimes restricted to the Roman or western part only—was perceptible and took its place along with the purely geographical term. Meanwhile, the Tartar invasions of the thirteenth century had destroyed the whole of Christian southern Russia and reduced the north to tributary status. The area through which the geographical boundary ran lay in thrall to Asiatic conquerors and had ceased utterly to be part of that Europe which identified itself with Christendom.

**II**

The Tartar subjugation of Russia and the growing conquest of the remainder of eastern Christendom by the Turks reinforced the tendency to restrict Europe, in the cultural sense, to the territories of the western Church. The Reformation split the spiritual unity of this smaller Europe, but homogeneous systems, institutions, usages and habits of thought, and one language among educated men of all nations, preserved community within it. The Renaissance reinforced the Mediterranean traditions which its peoples had in common, and the discovery of strange and barbarous worlds overseas, together with rapid advance in the arts and sciences, gave its peoples a feeling of confidence and superiority. Whatever the geographers might say, Europe was the territory inhabited by those peoples whose astounding achievements were so enthusiastically portrayed by Purchas and others. Russia could not be accepted as part of this Europe, and her territories and inhabitants were described in terms not so very different from those of the recently discovered lands overseas. Even after the Tartar yoke had been cast off, the Russian State continued to develop on Asiatic rather than European lines. When Herberstein visited Russia early in the sixteenth century he saw himself as venturing into Asia. Rabelais lumped the Muscovites along with Turks and Tartars as Asiatic. Sully, the minister of Henry IV of France, hesitated to include Russia in his European republic: its people were “in great part still idolaters, and in part schismatics” so that “there scarce remains any conformity among us with them; besides they belong to Asia as much as to Europe. We may indeed almost consider them as a barbarous country, and place them in the same class with Turkey.” Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Russians are depicted as backward and barbarous. English writers of the period were agreed in considering them as submissive, idolatrous, cruel, uncivilized and very much akin to savages; to cross the line from Russia into Sweden was to cross more than a mere international frontier; it was, “after a tedious association with a people barbarous and rude, to
fall amongst those who were civil and urbane."^23 The conclusion was naturally to deny that Russia was really part of Europe.^24

Thus for centuries, at least from the western point of view, the frontiers between Sweden, Poland and Austria on the one hand, and Russia and Turkey on the other, formed the eastern boundary of the European community. But the Renaissance geographers inherited through Ptolemy the classical view of Europe which is once again shown or described as a peninsula attached to Asia by a narrow isthmus, with the River Don forming the boundary and flowing southwards from the Riphaean Mountains to an elongated Sea of Azov, and with sometimes another river flowing northwards from these mountains to the northern sea.^[25 (Fig. 3.)

The mid-fifteenth century saw one remarkable exception to the ignorance of Russia evident on all medieval and classical maps and their Renaissance imitations.

![Fig. 3. Part of the map of the World by Grynaeus, Basel, 1532](image)

The Mappamundi of Fra Mauro, 1459, in its portrayal of Russia, is far ahead of its time. The Don is made to flow from a lake (not from the Riphaean Mountains) into a reasonably accurate Sea of Azov. A long Volga flows to the Caspian Sea, and it is this Volga, not the Don, that is suggested as the boundary between Europe and Asia.^[26 During the sixteenth century, geographical knowledge of Russia increased sufficiently for it to be realized that there was no narrow isthmus but a general eastward broadening of Europe into Asia; and that the Don was a relatively small river confined to the southern part of Russia and not in itself capable of forming the eastern boundary of the continent. Geographers were faced with the problem of reconciling classical authority with geographical reality. The results were found to be unsatisfactory: firstly, because they were arbitrary and academic boundaries bearing no relationship to what Europe meant to most people and, secondly, because they divided Russia into two.

From attempts by geographers to adapt the classical boundary to this growing knowledge of Russia, there came several boundaries, each of which predominated
for a period. But it must be stressed that, although there were at various times prevailing boundaries, each had many variations and rival lines continued to appear. There was never general agreement about any particular boundary. The problem of the great expanse of Russia northwards from the sources of the Don was at first solved by drawing a straight line until it met the White Sea at Archangel or its vicinity (Fig. 4). This was the prevailing view in the late fifteenth and throughout the sixteenth century. It was used by Pope Pius II (d. 1464) and by Ortelius in 1570; it was deliberately chosen by Purchas and by Brietius in the seventeenth century despite the claims of newer alternatives. Two other boundaries were favoured by most seventeenth century geographers: the Don-Dvina line and the Don-Volga-Kama-Ob line. As the century progressed, the latter gained in popularity and by the end of the seventeenth century it had established itself as the usual boundary, a position which it held well into the eighteenth. Two lesser seventeenth century alternatives were a Don-Volga-Pechora line, and a line drawn from the Don bend straight to the mouth of the Ob.

It was natural that, as knowledge of northern Russia spread, one of the north-flowing rivers should take the place of the straight line of the earlier boundary, especially as there was classical authority for such a river. If a north–south line

---

was to be maintained it was simplest to link the sources of the Don with the Dvina. This was done by Thevet in 1575, by Quade in 1596 and by several seventeenth century writers and cartographers.31 Among these was Peter Heylyn: "Europe is joined to Asia by that space of earth which is between the heads of the Tanais and Dvina."32 Although Ortelius in his maps and texts of Europe consistently gives the Don-straight line-White Sea boundary, the introduction of the Don-Volga-Kama-Ob line has often been ascribed to him, apparently through a misunderstanding of the text of his Asia map.33 The first deliberate claim for this line came from the pen of Philip Clüver, who has been called the "father of historical geography."34 In the first chapter of his 'Germania Antiqua' he discusses the problem of the eastern limit of Europe at great length. Retaining the Don in the south, and relying mainly on Pliny, he tries to prove that the river Ob is the northern part of Europe's eastern boundary.35 His arguments are not really convincing and were rejected and refuted by Brietius and Riccioli. Nevertheless, the Ob line won wide acceptance and by the end of the century could be termed "the most common opinion."36 It was adopted notably by Moretus in his revision of Ortelius, by Baudrand and Moreri in France, and by Wells and Moll in England, where it survived at least until 1797.37

Although classical authority was throughout this period the main factor in determining the European boundary, political considerations became of increasing weight. Thus the Don-Volga-Ob line was justified by Clüver not only because it allegedly had the best classical basis, but because "the whole of Great Russia, which is also called Muscovy, is thus contained in one Europe, whereas hitherto the greater part of it has been placed in Asia by the geographers of our age, using a line drawn from the Don source to the White Sea, which they derived from the erroneous belief of Ptolemy."38 This injection of a political element into the controversy came during a period of rapid Muscovite expansion; the boundaries of Russia were not only in a state of flux, but because of the difficulty in obtaining accurate information owing to Russian secrecy or ignorance, exceedingly difficult to determine. Consequently numerous boundaries are now found in pursuit of the chameleonic Russian political frontier. Duval tells of those who include in Europe "the conquests of the Great Duke of Muscovy which he made in the Asiatic Tartary."39

As a political boundary, the Don-Volga-Kama-Ob line had been outdated, even before its inception, by Ivan the Terrible's sweep down the Volga which culminated in his wrestling Astrakhan from the Tartars in 1566. As this knowledge began to reach western geographers, new but inevitably inaccurate and anachronistic lines began to appear. From the Black Sea various lines are followed to the Volga delta or the Caspian, thence northwards, usually to the Ob40 (Fig. 4). Brietius in 1648 mentions

"those who greatly expand Europe and to the above boundaries add the Caucasus Mts. . . . part of the Caspian Sea to the mouth of the Ural river . . . from the source of which they direct a line to the vicinity of the River Ob and use the rest of the Ob as far as the Northern Sea; thus they include the whole Muscovite state within Europe."41

Descriptive geographies of this period usually dealt with Russia or Muscovy under Europe, normally at the end of their treatment of that continent.42 However, they often noted that it was not all in Europe, as did the author of 'A Prospect of the Most Famous Parts of the World,' published in 1668: "Muscovia is the last region of Europe towards the east, and indeed stands a good part in Asia," and he breaks off his description of the country abruptly with the excuse: "But I must not pass too far this way. I have already set foot into Asia."43 The division of Russia into European
and Asiatic sections, which survives today, had good authority in antiquity, despite Cluver's denial. The river Don traditionally divided "Sarmatia," as the ancients called the territory, into European and Asiatic parts.\textsuperscript{44} Thus geographers like Brietius and Delisle, who disdained the political lines, preferring the Don–straight line–White Sea or Don-Dvina, were not perturbed because their boundaries divided Russia.

It should be noted in concluding the discussion of this particular period that some geographers and map-makers excluded Russia altogether, probably on cultural grounds, though this meant completely abandoning classical precedent—a difficult innovation to make in the intellectual climate of the time. The French geographer Rigaud in his ‘La Division du Monde’ (1560) placed "Ruthie, Russie ou Rassie" among the regions of Asia.\textsuperscript{45} Both Paulus Merula (1605) and Brietius (1648) refer to geographers who use the Dnieper–Lake Ladoga–Lake Onega–White Sea boundary, "thus adjudging the whole Muscovite state to Asia."\textsuperscript{46} Sanson, the French royal geographer, also placed the whole of Muscovy in Asia.\textsuperscript{47} Tacit support for this view comes from contemporary maps of Europe. In the early and middle sixteenth century, they usually stop short of Russia, possibly for lack of information. When, in the late sixteenth and throughout the seventeenth into the eighteenth centuries, they embrace at least part of Russia, there is a notable difference between the detail of the maps on either side of the Russo-Polish frontier. To the west, the maps are filled with minute detail; eastwards their nature changes abruptly; there is little detail and most of the space is filled with symbolic forests.\textsuperscript{48} As the period progresses, this contrast softens (see Plates between pp. 284–5).

In view of their future importance it is reasonable to ask, at this point, why the Urals played no part in this boundary-making. Von Herberstein, an early sixteenth century visitor to Russia, discovered the Urals for the west. They are shown on his map as a short, straight, but distinct range running north–south between the Ob and the Pechora, and Ortelius so placed them on his maps of Europe from 1570 on (Plate 3). Cluver confused the issue by asserting confidently that the Riphaei Montes of the ancients lay east–west, along the shores of the northern sea from the White Sea to the Gulf of Ob. To this imaginary range he gives the old Russian name for the real Urals, Kameny poyas or Stony Girdle. The real Urals he dogmatically dismisses from the discussion on the grounds that they are not the Riphaei Montes.\textsuperscript{49} When Moretus revised Ortelius's maps in 1624, he not only substituted the Cluverian Ob boundary for the Don–White Sea line, but took out the genuine Urals based on Herberstein's observations and put in Cluver's imaginary ones. By and large, however, seventeenth and early eighteenth century map-makers ignored them: the Urals are absent both from their maps and from the boundary controversy.\textsuperscript{50}

III

Early in the eighteenth century, the attitude of Europeans to Russia underwent a change and she was accorded grudging acceptance as a member of the European community. This period, during which Russia was widely recognized as part of Europe in a more than purely geographical sense, may be taken from the Peace of Nystadt in 1721 to the Revolution of 1917. The main reason for the alteration was the drastic europeanization of the Russian court and aristocracy carried out by Tsar Peter I after his return from his European tour. The manners and customs, the arts and crafts, the language and literature of the West were forced upon the upper stratum of society, so that visitors from Europe could, for the first time, feel more or less at home in the country. A new capital, Petersburg, was built in imitation of London, Paris and Vienna. A European model army was created which, after
Map of Europe in Johann Stumpf's Landtafeln, Zürich, 1562

By permission of the Trustees of the British Museum
Part of Rumold Mercator's
map of Europe, 1608

By permission of the Trustees of the British Museum
Part of the map of Europe in Ortelius's Theatrum, 1570
the defeat of the Swedes at Poltava in 1709, introduced Russia as a leading European power. In 1735 a Russian army put Augustus III of Saxony on the throne of Poland. It was no longer possible to write the political history of Europe without reference to Russia.\textsuperscript{53} Whereas Sully, a century before, had not thought it advisable to include Muscovy in his supra-national Europe, the Abbé Saint-Pierre now thought it "convenient and even necessary for the tranquility and security of the Society in general . . . to suffer the Czar to enter the Union." He is apologetic about it, however, for he knows "that the Christianity of his dominions is very different from that of ours, but they hope for salvation through Jesus Christ; therefore they are Christians." And if this appeal to charity should not suffice, it would still be wise to have the Russian "in order to save the expense of keeping upon the guard against him."\textsuperscript{52} The Paris 'Almanach Royal' in 1716 ends its list of European states with Poland, but in 1717, for the first time, "Moscovie" appears after "Pologne."\textsuperscript{53} Many European philosophers entertained high hopes of Russia's cultural promise and saw her as a missionary for civilization to Asia.\textsuperscript{54} Having overthrown Napoleon's might, she seemed to achieve the summit of respectability as a member of the Holy Alliance—a resurrection of the early European idea of a Christendom embracing Latin, Teuton and Slav alike. Russian music, literature and even science contributed to European civilization in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The europeanization of Russia and her acceptance by the West were both superficial. Only the upper layers of Russian society were affected; the "Asiatic mass,"\textsuperscript{55} far from benefiting from western culture, sank deeper and deeper into a misery and degradation such as no European peasantry had ever known. A vast empire, unbridled despotism and extreme servitude were, as Montesquieu pointed out, Asiatic rather than European characteristics,\textsuperscript{56} and we still find Europe contrasted with rather than including Russia.\textsuperscript{57} If Russian power and influence in Europe increased, so did an answering resentment; Rousseau and other French publicists warned that Europe must be on her guard against "Asiatic" Russia.\textsuperscript{58} In Germany, Ranke suggested that Russia was too deeply affected by Asiatic conditions to form an integral part of Europe.\textsuperscript{59} Nothing could give Russia that common Graeco-Latin heritage which the other European peoples shared and she did not. It was not entirely a matter of Western rejection of Russia. Powerful influences in Russia, notably the Slavophil movement, were opposed to the European nexus and hoped Russia would develop her own indigenous culture. To the average Russian, just as to Peter I when he spoke of needing a "window looking on Europe," Europe was something apart.\textsuperscript{60}

By an interesting coincidence, the same Battle of Poltava (1709) and Treaty of Nystadt (1721) which announced Russia's militant arrival on the European stage, also contributed to the next great change in the eastern boundary of geographical Europe. A Swedish officer, taken prisoner at Poltava, spent thirteen years in Russia until his release after the Peace. While there, he diligently studied the geography of the Tsar's realm and at Stockholm in 1730 published the book in which he claimed that the Ural Mts, not the Ob, were the real eastern limit of Europe. He justified his new approach on the grounds that there was now such confusion that many map-makers were not even attempting to draw a boundary.\textsuperscript{61} He dismisses the Ob as having been chosen for various inadequate reasons: because it was thought to be the political boundary of Russia, which it was not; because, in ignorance of the existence of the Urals, the Ob had seemed a good demarcation; and because geographers thought Asia, being so much larger, could afford to be generous to Europe.\textsuperscript{62}
The Urals, Strahlenberg contended, could be justified on excellent geographical grounds and his work is doubly important because he not only introduced a new boundary, but based it mainly on factors of physical geography, rather than on political or classical grounds. The Urals were not merely a watershed but divided land of different slope and elevation: on the Asiatic side great rivers flowed northwards, while on the European side they flowed both north and south; there were, he alleged, important differences in the plant, animal and mineral geography of either side. He also invoked classical authority as the Urals were "without doubt" the Montes Riphaei of the ancients. Having taken the Urals, Strahlenberg resolved the problem of where to go when their southern end was reached, by looking for an elevated line. He branched westwards along the Obschi Syrt, which he regarded as a branch of the Urals, and then took the high right bank of the Volga until he reached the Don (Fig. 7A). Strahlenberg's Ural boundary was accepted by most geographers, particularly after the Russian Pallas gave it confirmation and support in 1771. For Kant, in 1802, it was the natural dividing line between the two continents on physical, economic and human grounds. Malte Brun, in 1811, acclaimed it as "an unquestionable principle that the chain of Ural or Verchotian Mts. marks the natural division between Europe and northern Asia." Because they were "a chain of mountains at least as considerable as the Alps" they were "without a doubt the natural dividing line between Europe and Asia." This "grand natural limit" was possibly favoured by the Romantic Age as representing a "back to nature" move in geography away from classical or political considerations.

There was less agreement about the continuation of Strahlenberg's boundary between the southern end of the Urals and the Black Sea–Caucasus–Caspian zone where the steppes are interposed and where, according to Humboldt, Europe gradually merges into Asia without any marked dividing line. The connection between the Urals and the Don was made in several ways. The most popular followed the Kama to the Volga instead of using the Samara; some preferred to maintain an elevated line all the way by continuing from the Volga Heights along the Ergeni Hills to the Caucasus; but the chief rivals to the Strahlenberg-Pallas line were those that went from the southern end of the Urals to the Caspian Sea, using either the River Ural or the River Emba, or occasionally the divide between them. Variations of the Ural-Volga-Don boundary prevailed throughout the last quarter of the eighteenth century, having largely ousted those which used the Ob. They continued to dominate texts and maps in Germany and Britain until about 1849. Ritter, who died in 1859, argued for the Strahlenberg line as the natural boundary of Europe. This Ural-Volga-Don line is found in Germany down to 1879, but by then it had lost general support.

IV

The Ural Mountains–Ural (or Emba) River–Caspian–Caucasus boundary that is conventional today was introduced in France early in the nineteenth century. Occasionally the depressions within and north of the Caucasus, rather than the mountains themselves, carry the line from the Caspian to the Black Sea (Fig. 7C). In 1803, Mentelle and Brun, after mentioning that "there is no agreement on the boundaries to be given to Europe," put forward a Urals-Emba-Caspian-Caucasus line. They attacked the Strahlenberg-Pallas boundary, although it had been "welcomed by all the German geographers," because it arbitrarily cut the Volga basin in two. In 1811, Malte-Brun gave what is probably the earliest textual enunciation of the so-called "traditional" Urals-Ural-Caspian line. At about the
same time Hérisson published in Paris what may be the first cartographic portrayal of that boundary. It appears on Lapie's map in 1812, and in almost all subsequent French atlases and texts. German geographers, however, only occasionally took this line, the majority following Strahlenberg. No English map appears to have carried the Urals-Ural line until that published by the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in 1844 and Wyld's map of 1845. The first English text to use it may have been Gilbert's 'Geography' of 1846.

The welcome accorded to the Urals was by no means unanimous. There were objections from those who denied that there were such striking physical differences between one side and the other and from those who insisted that the Urals formed a whole and should not be divided. These objectors sometimes postulated

boundaries running east of the Urals in the Ob-Irtysh-Tobol-Caspian depression (Fig. 7d): they argued that there had been sea here in recent geological time, dividing Europe from Asia. The French geographer Reclus asserted in 1875 that:

"the true zone of separation between Europe and Asia is not formed by mountain systems but, on the contrary, by a series of depressions, once wholly filled by an arm of the sea which joined the Mediterranean with the Arctic Ocean." A similar viewpoint was expressed by Wisotzki in 1879, while Hahn drew his boundary along the eastern border of the Ural region "where the West Siberian plain begins." The search for a natural boundary led Gmelin as far east as the Yenisei (Fig. 5).

A few were not content to rely merely on physical geography but brought in human factors. Hase tried to draw a line between Slav and Tartar (Fig. 7b).
Ritter claimed that the Strahlenberg line was not only the “natural boundary,” but the racial, economic and human one as well, and Hahn had similar pretensions for his own suggestion.83 Mackinder took an individualistic approach which also ignored the Urals (Fig. 7e). He ran a line from Petersburg to the Volga, and after including the lower Kama valley, followed the Volga to the Don bend, and then the Don to the Black Sea. Behind this line lay “the real Europe, the Europe of the European peoples, the Europe which was ‘a perfectly definite social conception.’” He considered Russia (before the Revolution) to have been European as far as this line, the Volga high bank of which, with Strahlenberg, Pallas and Ritter, he deemed the natural boundary:

“Stand on the top of this brink, looking eastward across the broad river below you, and you will realise that you have populous Europe at your back, and in front, where the low meadows fade away into the half sterility of the drier steppes eastward, you have the beginnings of Central Asia.”84

The eighteenth century enthusiasm for a natural boundary had but scotched the political boundary. It emerges again in Russia and Germany where it prevailed throughout the second half of the nineteenth century; it was occasionally found in Britain.85 Its reappearance was delayed by the secrecy and confusion that long surrounded the border between metropolitan Russia and her Asiatic empire: “it varies from map to map and is being constantly changed by the Russian government”86; “we do not yet know how the Russian government divides its Asiatic provinces from the European.”87 Such difficulties did not deter map-makers from using what evidence they could find. As early as 1745 a Russian atlas showed a distinction between the “governments” of Russia and the “provinces” of Siberia,88 and German geographers particularly often took the point of view that the eastern boundary of Europe was the Tsar of Russia’s business.89 It happened that the political boundary, when it became definite, approximately followed the Urals-Ural line (Fig. 7e, line 4). So that at the end of the nineteenth century there is a “natural” line (prevailing in Britain and France) and a “political” line (in Germany and Russia) which are not so very dissimilar.

Notice should be taken of a growing tendency in the nineteenth century to regard Europe and Asia as one continent, of which Europe was but the western peninsula: “Europe is properly speaking only a large peninsula terminating the vast Asiatic continent in the west”90; “strictly speaking, these two form only one continent, the natural division being not so strongly marked as to make a separation.”91 The name of Eurasia, given to the united continent by Suess in 1885, passed into common use.92 Mackinder stressed the essential unity of “Euro-Asia,” while noting that around this “heartland” of the “world-island,” there were four appendages: peninsular Europe, South-west Asia, China and India. Within the “Euro-Asian” heartland he included most of Russia, since the east–west alignment of climatic-vegetational belts, continued from Asia, was of greater importance than the superficial north–south feature of the Urals.93 In 1913, Supan argued that Eurasia was an integral whole permitting division only into sub-continents; he did not consider Russia as part of Europe but the “European peninsula” had no greater claim to be detached from Asia than had India.94 A few other attempts were made to exclude Russia by taking her western frontier as Europe’s limit95 (Fig. 7e, line 1). But this was against the general opinion that Russia was now, at least in a restricted sense, part of Europe. In fact, at no time before or since was there greater agreement between the prevalent geographical, political, and cultural ideas of what constituted Europe than in the period preceding the Great War of 1914–18.
During this war, however, belief in Russia's successful assimilation was undermined by the fantastic career of the Siberian peasant Rasputin, and her place in cultural Europe was abruptly terminated by the 1917 Revolution. The westernized upper crust of court and aristocracy was destroyed in the explosion. There was now once more, as Schmitthenner puts it, "a culture-front between Europe and the Russian world,"96 while the historian Halecki writes:

"Whatever we may think about the more or less European character of the Empire which lasted from Peter I to Nicholas II, the 'Red Tsardom' created in November 1917... was and remained non-European."97

Furthermore, the political and administrative boundaries between Russia and her Asiatic empire, and the racial distinction which they implied, were dissolved, and the U.S.S.R. emerged as a unified division of Eurasia. The Urals ceased to be a dividing line.98

V

The two great wars of this century have destroyed European supremacy and weakened her cultural distinctiveness. After the First World War, Europe began to receive rather than emit cultural and political influences; large numbers of Europeans began to look to Hollywood or Moscow for their cultural or political inspiration. In a sense, Hitler's "New Order" was an attempt to reassert European supremacy in that it was opposed both to American and to Russian influences. But it was false to most of the ideals and traditions without which Europe was scarcely worth preserving. In the 1939–45 period, Europe suffered military invasion from both east and west and non-European forces entered almost every country. In most instances they are still there. This military and political catastrophe was followed by cultural disintegration and some have argued that Europe in the historical sense no longer exists.99 The result of this has been to give renewed urgency to the question of the eastern boundary. Since the Russian revolution, and even more since 1945, historians, political scientists, students of international affairs and others have shown increasing interest in the problem. Generally speaking, they cannot accept the conventional Ural boundary of the geographers. Among the views of European scholars of renown, the following are typical. The Swiss historian Reynold, in his great work 'La formation de l'Europe' is definite on the question of Russia:

"Russia does not belong to Europe, but to Asia... Russia is the geographical antithesis of Europe. This premise is fundamental: the Russia-Europe antithesis is found at every level."100

The Polish historian Halecki implies the same when he says that Europe is distinguished by its "extraordinary variety of particular regions within the narrow limits of that peninsula attached to the huge Asiatic continent. Whatever is colossal and uniform is definitely un-European." "A purely geographical" answer to the problem of Europe's extent

"is obviously inadequate, and since it is equally obvious that the area included in the historical concept of the European community cannot be extended indefinitely into the plains of Northern Asia, the question arises whether the eastern frontier of that community ever did reach the Urals, whether it did not, in fact, remain west of it, as in Ptolemy's interpretation,"

and he adduces the Russian Slavophil tradition that Russia was not part of but opposed to Europe.107 Sir Ernest Barker, after stating that Europe is a "horizontal
peninsula . . . an annexe or outcrop of the vast land mass of Asia," emphasizes the shifting, impermanent nature of its boundaries:

"The line of its junction with the land mass is a shifting borderland which has wavered and oscillated in the course of history. At one time it is a line drawn far away to the east, along the Ural Mts and down to the Caspian Sea; at another it is a line pushed back towards the west, and running down from the east of the Baltic to the west coast of the Black Sea, or even still farther west." 103

Toynbee is scathing in his reference to the orthodox Ural line of the geographers, speaking of them being reduced to

"dissecting the living body politic of Russia into an imaginary 'Russia in Europe' and 'Russia in Asia' along the unconvincing line of the Ural river and the Ural Mts . . . thereafter the geographers belatedly discovered that the Ural Mts which they had made into a household word were not more noticeable a feature in the physical landscape than the Chiltern Hills, and that this vaunted physical barrier between Europe and Asia was not strongly enough pronounced even to serve as a boundary between one local province of the Russian Empire and another." 103

In the post-war world the tendency is undoubtedly for all who treat of world affairs and European problems to think in terms of a small Europe. The College of Europe at Bruges considers Europe as that part of Eurasia west of the U.S.S.R. 104 A leading article in *The Observer* recently asserted that Russia was now "outside Europe altogether." 105 According to *The Economist*

"there is now only a 'western' and an 'eastern' Europe and of these two, only what is called western Europe is habitually regarded in the West as European at all. The vision or the recollection of the large Europe that existed 50 years ago is left as a monopoly to the (fortunately few) advocates of reconquest. The rest of us have quickly got used to the idea of a very little Europe indeed." 106

French and English-speaking geographers have generally accepted the Ural-Caspian line without demur; they may sometimes comment upon its arbitrariness, but more or less accept it as "traditional" or "conventional." 107 There are exceptions. Kish considers there is "ample reason" to prefer the western boundary of the Soviet Union, while Cressey emphatically rejects the Ural line; he concludes: "Even the crest of the Urals supplies no more of a boundary than the Appalachians. Would anyone divide the United States into two continents?" 108

In contrast to this passive acceptance of a conventional line, vigorous controversy has continued elsewhere, especially in Germany. Coudenhove-Kaleri, trying in 1935 to discover how geographers limited Europe, circulated a questionnaire to leading European political geographers. Of 42 replies, most (14) were for the western frontier of the Soviet Union, and 12 for the Ural line; the rest chose other boundaries or declined to give a definite or unqualified reply. 109 Schmitthenner, whose attitude may have been coloured by Nazi ideology, distinguished the "real" Europe from Russia, but Kleist insists that Russia belongs to Europe. 110 In 1954 Louis introduced a new conception of Europe as a continent. According to him there is no "natural" or physical division between Europe and Asia; the separation must be made on grounds of human geography, particularly population density. He extends Europe into Siberia to include that eastward extension of population which, with the Urals as a base, has its apex in the vicinity of the Yenisei. 111 Otto Mauull takes a similar view 112 (Fig. 5). But the rapid changes in the population dis-
tribution of Siberia consequent upon Soviet economic development make any such demographic idea of Europe as unsatisfactory as that which followed the shifting eastern boundary of Russia.

In the Soviet Union a final decision seems to have been reached, after much debate, to draw the boundary "along the eastern foot of the Urals, the Mugodzhar mountains, the Emba river, the north shore of the Caspian, the Kumo-Manych depression and the south coast of the Sea of Azov to the Kerch Straits." This places the whole Ural system in Europe, the Caucasus wholly in Asia. As it is Soviet policy to appear

European to the Europeans and Asian to the Asians, this is an advantage the Soviets cannot be expected to forgo.

The best solution to this problem of a division between Europe and Asia would seem to lie in discarding as outmoded the division of Eurasia into two very unequal parts along arbitrary and questionable lines, but rather to divide it into several subcontinents without violating the integrity of the Soviet Union (Fig. 6). Europe then becomes indisputably that part of the continent to the west of the U.S.S.R. This interpretation is realistic in that it accords with what thinking people today mean by Europe, and it closely coincides with the historical and essentially geographical Europes. "For almost a thousand years Europe meant the community of western peoples who lived, broadly speaking, between Scandinavia and Sicily, the British Isles and the Priep Marshes." That is what it means again today.

It is no coincidence that "historical Europe" has its counterpart in a geographically distinct western extremity of Eurasia. To the west of the zone between the

Fig. 6. Subdivisions of the Eurasian continent
Baltic and Black Seas, there lies an area with such an eventful geological history that its present structure is of unparalleled complexity and defies simplification. This involved anatomy of a complex of regions that have been so many times folded and faulted, warped and twisted, elevated and submerged, eroded and rejuvenated, as to present a lithological mosaic on the surface, is reflected in highly fragmented and individualistic relief as well as in the vegetative pattern. The great belts of vegetation and soils that stripe the other continents become unrecognizable in these western lands where soils and plant life reflect rather the rapid transition of local lithological, physiographical and human phenomena, than the broader climatic controls which determine the soil and vegetation zones of the great continents (Fig. 7f). The boundary or transition between the oceanic and continental climates lies also in this Baltic–Black Sea zone. Kendrew, who found it convenient climatically to include all Russia under Asia, wrote:

"... at the Vistula the climate has become definitely continental. That river forms a convenient if arbitrary boundary between the relatively maritime climates of western and central Europe and the essentially continental type of practically all the Russian territory." \(^{116}\)

Under Köppen’s classification, the line dividing the “C” or humid mild-winter climates from the “D” or humid severe-winter climates likewise falls in this zone.

Thus it can be argued that, although Europe is not a distinct continent in the literal sense, there is a clear differentiation of the land west of the Baltic–Black Sea zone. The peculiar features of this land, its diversity of regions, variety of soils, favourable climate and penetration by the sea, were powerful factors in its material progress and the advance of its civilization. Possibly too, the diversity of Europe has led to those internal antagonisms that have drained its strength and destroyed its culture \(^{117}\); on the other hand, it made the western end of Eurasia more easily defensible against Asiatic invaders who had been able to sweep with little resistance over the plains of Asia and Russia. Europe became culturally distinct because it was geographically different. \(^{118}\) The extension into Russia destroys that distinctiveness which is the only safe ground for differentiating Europe at all. When Samuel Purchas eulogized Europe at the beginning of the seventeenth century, his words would have made no sense if applied to Russia as well:

"In Europe neither watery fens, nor unstable bogs, nor inland seas, nor unwholesome ayres, nor wild woods, with their wilder savage inhabitants, nor snow-covered hills, nor stiffling frosts, nor long long nights, nor craggy rocks, nor barren sands, nor any other effect of angry nature ... can prohibit all habitation and humane society." \(^{119}\)

For Russia, to quote Elisée Reclus, is “half Asiatic in its extreme climate, in the landscape of its monotonous countryside and limitless steppes." \(^{120}\) Likewise, when the modern French geographer Blanchard writes “In Europe all is variety ... Europe is a mosaic made up of countless cells,” he is compelled to except Russia because it “weighs upon the continent with all its Asiatic mass.” \(^{121}\)

There are further arguments for differentiating Europe as a sub-continent of Eurasia along the western borders of the U.S.S.R. Such a solution removes Europe from its privileged position as a separate continent, recognizing that it is actually part—and a small part—of a coherent land mass; instead it places Europe on equal terms with South-west Asia, China and India as one of the sub-continents of Eurasia; this accords more with the modern world situation now that the political and cultural supremacy of Europe has departed. Although Russia is excluded from
A. The Ural-Obshchi Syrt-Volga-Don/Ergen Hills boundary and the Kama variant

B. An attempt at an ethnographic boundary

1. RECLUS (Paris 1875) and WISOTZKI (Königsberg 1879)
2. HAHN (Leipzig 1881)
3. PHILIPPSON (Leipzig 1928)

D. Boundaries drawn east of the Ural

E. Some early twentieth-century between the Heartland and the
The Geographical Journal

17th and Twentieth Century Boundaries of Europe

- MENTELLE and MALTE BRUN (Paris 1803)
- MALTE BRUN (Paris 1811)

C. The Ural-Ural River and the Ural-Mugodshar Hills-Emba River boundaries.

- Approximate edge of the Russian platform
- Boundary between Koppen's 'C' and 'D' climates

The geographical boundary between European Russia and Asiatic Tartary

- The western frontier of the Soviet Union and the conventional Ural boundary.
Europe, it is not thereby placed in Asia, but forms a sub-continent of its own. Geographers might welcome this suggestion on the grounds that it would be readily acceptable to scholars in other disciplines and to those concerned with current affairs. Their opinion of geography is not enhanced by being confronted either with the unthinking use of a quite unrealistic and indefensible division or else with a confused controversy. On more practical grounds, its general acceptance would free geographers from the obligation which they apparently feel today, to include part of the Soviet Union in their works on Europe.\footnote{122} Since Russia is dealt with more satisfactorily in works on the Soviet Union written presumably by those specially qualified in Soviet affairs and the Russian language, its treatment in works on Europe by writers unlikely to be Soviet specialists is superfluous if not ridiculous. Finally, map-makers, in order to include Russia’s great area, are compelled to sacrifice much detail in Europe proper. General recognition of Europe as peninsular Eurasia to the west of the U.S.S.R. would allow a considerably larger scale to be used. A possible objection might be that the border between Russia and Poland-Romania is merely a political line and as such liable to change. It has certainly undergone considerable alteration in the first half of the twentieth century, but it has always lain in that Baltic–Black Sea Sea zone which constitutes the geographical and historical frontier. Drastic changes in this boundary are unlikely without a major war, and their remote possibility need not stand in the way of its acceptance as a desirable and practical line along which to limit Europe.

Acknowledgement.—The author of this article gladly acknowledges the help he received from the staff of the British Museum Map Room.

REFERENCES

2 Ritter suggested that Europe was the name given by the inhabitants of the high Caucasus (Kauk-Asos) to the plains north and west of them. See ‘Vorlesungen über Europa,’ Berlin, 1863, p. 47. Europe may be derived from the Greek όφανός, meaning ‘broad-faced;’ c.f. the derivation of Latium from latus, also meaning ‘broad.’
5 Herodotus, IV, 46.
6 Herodotus, IV, 45.
8 Herodotus, IV, 42, where he says that Europe stretches alongside both Africa and Asia. He continued the boundary eastwards from the Caspian Sea by the River Araxes.
9 Eratosthenes, Strabo and Ptolemy used the Palus Mæotis–Tanaïs boundary.
10 According to Strabo, the Don flows between the Sea of Azov and the northern ocean; according to Ptolemy, it rises in the Hyperborei Montes, an alternative name for the Riphaean Mts.
11 In Pliny this is the River Carambyce; on Ptolemy’s map it is the Cherusinus.
12 As in the report of one-eyed men and griffins referred to by Herodotus, III, 116.
13 See D. Hay, ‘Europe, the emergence of an idea,’ Edinburgh, 1957, p. 11.
16 William of Malmesbury, quoted by Hay, op. cit., p. 31; Isidore of Seville (d. 636), ‘Praeclarissimum Opus,’ 1509 ed., p. iii.
17 This theme is developed at length by Hay, op. cit., cap. 4.
19
14 Ibid., p. 147.
15 Map of the world by Reisch, Fribourg, 1503, reproduced in Nordenskiöld. Fascimile Atlas, map xxxi; Vadianus J., 'Epitome Trium Terrae Partium,' world map, Zürich, 1534; 'Landtafeln,' Zürich, 1562, world map on title-page, dated 1546.
17 Aeneas Sylvius (Pope Pius II), 'Asiae Europaeque Elegantissima Descriptio,' Paris, 1534, p. 494: "Europa divitit ab Asia mari Aegaeo, Propontide, Ponto Euxino, Maeotide palude, Tanai fluvio, et hinc linea quae recta a fontibus Tanais ad septentriionem porrigitur;" Ortelius, 'Theatrum Orbis Terrarum,' Antwerp, 1570, text: "Tanai fluvio (vulgo Don) et Isthmo qui est ab eius fontibus, recta ad Septentriionem ab Asia dirimitur"; Hay is mistaken in giving Ortelius's maps of Europe as a reference for an Ob boundary, as on these maps the Ob is clearly shown to be in Asia; Purchas, 'His Pilgrimes,' 1613, in Hakluyt Society Extra Series, Vol. 1, 1905, p. 248; Brietiuss, 'parallela Geographiae Veteres et Novae,' Paris, 1648, Vol. 1, p. 163.
18 Hahn's statement, in 'Zur Geschichte der Grenze zwischen Europa und Asien,' Mitt. Ver. Erdk. Lpz. (1881), p. 88, repeated by Hay, op. cit., p. 123, that this line was held by the majority of geographers throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, is incorrect.
19 Visscher, map entitled 'Nova Europae descriptio,' 1631.
20 Robbe, 'Méthode pour apprendre facilement la géographie,' Paris, 1685, 2nd ed., p. 77: "le fleuve Don et par une ligne tirée de la courbure la plus orientale de ce fleuve au Golphe de la mer glaciale, qui est entre le détroit de Weigatz et l'embouchure du fleuve Ob"; Duval, 'The present state of the world,' 2nd ed., London, 1691, p. 197; L. Moreiri, 'Le Grand Dictionnaire Historique,' Lyon, 1683, under "Europe": "Le Don ou le Tanais, duquel il faut tirer une ligne jusqu'au fleuve Obi, et jusqu'à l'Océan glacial."
23 'Cosmographie,' London, 1652, p. 32.
24 On this point see Wisotzki, op. cit., pp. 408-10.
25 Cluverius was born at Danzig in 1580 and became a renowned scholar of the University of Leiden; he made a special study of the ancient geographers. See J. Parths, 'Philipp Clüver der Begründer der historischen Länderkunde,' Geogr. Abh. Wien 5 (1891) pp. 161-213.
27 Baudrand, M. A., 'Dictionnaire Géographique et Historique,' Paris, 1705, under "Europe": "J'ai cru devoir suivre la plus commune opinion qui met les bornes de l'Europe à la rivière d'Oby."
28 Moretus, B., revision of Ortelius, 'Theatrum Orbis Terrarum,' Antwerp, 1624; "Fines statuum ipsam Tanaim, Isthmum inter hunc et Rha fluvium, huiusque versus orientem diver- tigium, inde Oby fluviun, ad ostium hujus usque"; Baudrand, op. cit., under "Europe"; Moreiri, op. cit., under "Europe"; E. Wells, 'A Treatise of Ancient and Present Geography,' Oxford, 1701, p. 17: "But the larger discoveries having since been made of those countries, the eastern boundary there seems now most naturally to be made up partly by the R. Don, partly by the R. Wolga, and partly by the River Oby"; H. Moll, 'A New Map of Europe,' London, 1708; A. Adam, 'A summary of geography and history,' 2nd ed., London, 1797.
29 Clüver, op. cit., p. 21: "Hac denique ratione omnis Russia Major...in una continenti Europa."
30 Duval, op. cit., p. 197.
31 E.g. Valck, 'Europa,' Amsterdam, 1680; on this map the boundary runs from the north shore of the Caspian, between the mouths of the Volga and the Ural, north-eastwards towards the Ob mouth.
41. Brietiùs, P., 'Parallele Geographiae Veteris et Novae,' Paris, 1648, pp. 162-3. This early seventeenth century political boundary using the Ural and Ob Rivers was mentioned by Cluver but rejected by him ('Germaniae Antiquae,' pp. 18-19).

42. E.g., Muenster, Sebastian, 'Mappa Europa eigenlich furgebildet aussgelegt und beschribenn...,' Frankfurt am Meun, 1536; Merula, Paulus, 'Cosmographie Generalis libre tres,' Amsterdam, 1605; P. Cluverius, 'Introductionis in universam geographiam, tam veterem quam novam, libri VI,' Leiden, 1624, p. 168.

43. 'A Prospect of the Most Famous Parts of the World,' London, 1668, pp. 42-3.

44. Thus the early geography of Russia by the Polish Maciej z Michowas was entitled 'Tractatus de duabus Sarmatiis Asiana et Europiana,' 1518; Moll, op. cit., p. 148: 'Muscovy is a great part of the old Sarmatia Europae.' The two Sarmatias were distinguished by Ptolemy.


46. Merula, Paulus, 'Cosmographie Generalis libre tres,' Amsterdam, 1605; Brietiùs, op. cit., p. 163.

47. Sanson, 'Cartes Générales des Toutes les Parties du Monde,' Paris, 1650, Map 3, 'Asie.'

48. Ortelius, op. cit.; Mercator, map entitled 'Europe,' 1568.

49. Herberts, 'Rerum Moscovitarum,' Basle, 1551; Cluverius, 'Germaniae Antiquae libre tres,' pp. 11-16.

50. An exception is the map of the world in 'Atlas Major, sive Cosmographia Universalis,' Vol. 1, Amsterdam, 1666, where the Urals are shown as a short range north of 60°N. but not named.


53. Not 1716 as stated by Hay, op. cit., p. 125, fn. 1.


56. Montesquieu, 'Esprit des Lois,' 1748, V, xiv: '. . . la partie du monde où le despotisme est pour ainsi dire naturalisé, qui est l'Asie;' XII, vi: 'En Asie on a toujours vu des empires; en Europe, ils n'ont jamais pu subsister.'

57. E.g., W. Menzel, 'Europe in 1840,' London, 1841, p. 31: 'The people of Europe, enjoying even under absolute monarchies greater freedom than Russia, view her principles with dislike.'

58. Gollwitzer, op. cit., p. 78.

59. Ranke, F. von, 'Geschichte der romanischen und germanischen Völker von 1494 bis 1535,' Leipzig, 1824, p. iii: 'Das russische Reich das den ganzen Norden von Asien begreift, könnte ihrer Lage nach nicht ohne ein Durchdringen und Hereinziehen der gesamten asiatischen Verhältnisse grundständlich verstanden werden.'

60. Supan, A., 'Die Europäische Halbinsel,' Naturwissenschaften (1913) p. 688: 'Wenn ein Russ nach Westen reist, so sagt er, er gehe nach Europa.'


62. Ibid., p. 105.

63. Ibid., pp. 107-11.

64. Ibid., p. 106. This is the official Soviet view—see 'Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya,' Moscow, 1956, Vol. 44, under 'Ural.'


73 Hahn, op. cit., p. 94. Strahlenberg had referred to this possibility, op. cit., p. 107.
78 Hérisson, M., 'Nouvelle carte générale et détaillée de l’Europe,' Paris, n.d.; refers to "S.M. l’Empereur et S.M. le roi de Hollande" and can therefore be dated approximately.
81 Wisotzki, E., 'Die Verteilung vom Wasser und Land an der Erdoberfläche,' Königsberg, 1879, These I; Hahn, op. cit., p. 101 and map at end of article.
83 Ritter, op. cit., p. 65; Hahn, op. cit., p. 104.
85 As in the 'Cambridge Modern History Atlas.'
86 Ritter, op. cit., p. 66.
87 Hahn, op. cit., p. 98.
88 'Russischer Atlas: Mappa Generalis Totius Imperii Russici,' Petersburg, 1745.
90 Lapie, Paris, 1829, quoted in Reynolds, 'Qu’est-ce que l’Europe?,' Fribourg, 1944, p. 50.
92 Sue, E., 'Das Antlitz der Erde,' Prague, 1885, Vol. 1, p. 768.
94 Supan, A., op. cit., p. 689.
97 Halleck, op. cit., p. 99.
98 Ibid.: "Now even the administrative boundary between the geographically European and Asiatic parts of Russia disappeared completely"; Holborn, op. cit., p. 9: "The Urals are not a dividing line in modern Russia."
99 Holborn, op. cit., p. x: "What is commonly called the ‘historic Europe’ is dead and beyond resurrection."
101 Halleck, op. cit., pp. 87–90.
107 Shackleton, M. R., ‘Europe,’ 5th ed., London, 1954, p. 3; J. Gottmann, ‘Geography of Europe,’ New York, 1954, p. 8: "There is little use in changing the meaning of a geographical name, and there is no imperative reason to reconsider now the limits of the space traditionally called Europe"; A. G. Ogilvie, ‘Europe and its borderlands,’ London, 1957, p. xii: "The traditional eastern limit of Europe, the Ural Mountains and the Caspian depression, is adopted as acceptable for the purpose of this study despite the fact that it is now quite unrealistic in view of the political and economic organization of the USSR."
and Peninsular Europe, but the latter "ist damit nur ein Teil, wenn auch der bislang wichtigste Teil, eines wirklichen anthropogeographischen Gesamtkontinuums: Europa," p. 90.


114 A Europe which divides politically into East and West. The idea of Central Europe would seem to have died in the War; cp. The Economist, 28 February 1959: "The term 'central Europe' has almost disappeared from the European vocabulary."

115 Holborn, op. cit., p. 3.


117 Halecki, op. cit., p. 52.

118 Reclus, op. cit., p. 13: "C'est au milieu des îles, des péninsules, des vallées, des petits bassins, des horizons variés de l'Europe maritime et montagneuse; c'est dans cette nature si vivante, si accidentée, aux contrastes si imprévus qu'est née la civilisation moderne, résultat d'innombrables civilisations locales, heureusement unies en un seul courant."

119 Purchas, op. cit., p. 248.

120 Reclus, op. cit., p. 13.


122 Or even the whole Soviet Union, since the Urals are not a convincing boundary and the U.S.S.R. should not be split! This reductio ad absurdum is seen in V. Lefebvre, 'L'Europe et l'Asie Soviétique au milieu du XXme Siècle,' Brussels, 1956, and in Derrau, 'L'Europe,' Paris, 1958. In these works the whole Soviet Union is avowedly included because of the difficulty of making a division, and Lefebvre concludes that there would be little wisdom in dividing his book into two parts "sous prétexte que l'immense Russie s'étend de part et d'autre de l'Oural."